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COMMENT
Shareholder Democracy: A Description and Critical Analysis
of the Proxy System
Concern over the social, political, and economic accountability of the cor-
porations that lie at the heart of our modem economic system has heightened
as wealth and economic power in American society have become more con-
centrated in those corporations. The efficacy of the mechanisms of corporate
accountability, such as proxy solicitation and shareholder participation in the
corporate electoral process, has been drawn into question. The SEC is cur-
rently in the midst of a broad reexamination of its rules and regulations con-
ceming shareholder communications, shareholder participation in the
corporate electoral process and corporate governance.' Through description
and critical analysis of the present proxy system, this Comment examines the
validity of corporate democracy as a policy objective and attempts to provide a
conceptual framework for defining the extent of corporate democracy that is
socially desirable. Specifically, the Comment discusses whether the share-
holder proposal rule provides an acceptable platform for shareholder commu-
nication and whether shareholders should have direct access to corporate
proxy materials.
INTRODUCTION
In discussing the nature and mechanics of the proxy system, one must first
consider the essential characteristics of the corporate model and, more specifi-
cally, the limited role that shareholders play in the management of the enter-
prise. Under the traditional corporate model, management is vested in a
board of directors with ownership of the corporation in its shareholders. As a
general proposition, shareholders are not involved in the day-to-day opera-
tions of the corporation. In terms of participation in control of the corpora-
tion, however, shareholders possess certain limited management functions.
For example, shareholder control in the form of voting at shareholder meet-
ings or of providing written consent exists with respect to (1) election and re-
moval of directors; (2) adoption, amendment and repeal of bylaws;
(3) adoption of resolutions; and (4) approval of extraordinary corporate mat-
ters such as mergers, dissolutions and charter amendments. 2 Thus, under the
corporate model, shareholders elect the board of directors, who in turn man-
age the corporation by creating corporate policies and appointing officers to
carry out such policies. In accordance with democratic principles, the direc-
tors and management are held accountable to the shareholder-owners by vir-
tue of the annual elections which involve positions of director and other
1. Sec. Exch. Act Release No. 34-16104, 44 Fed. Reg. 48,938 (1979).
2. H. Henn, Law of Corporations § 188 (2d ed. 1970).
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matters subject to shareholder action. Hence the model has been described as
that of a corporate democracy.
The foundation for shareholder control under the corporate model is
shareholder voting at the corporation's annual meeting. The proxy system is
aimed at facilitating such voting by allowing shareholders to execute proxies
authorizing specified individuals to represent the shareholders' interests and to
vote the shares. Because of the tremendous growth of large, publicly-held cor-
porations having many geographically dispersed shareholders, the solicitation
of proxies has become a practical necessity.3
Generally, under principles of state corporate law, management may use
the proxy machinery to give notice of an upcoming shareholders' meeting, to
produce a quorum and to notify shareholders of corporate matters.4 In addi-
tion, subject to certain general limitations, management is able to designate its
nominees for director in the corporate proxy materials.5 Thus, in a practical
sense management's access to the corporate proxy machinery is largely un-
restricted.
I. THE ExISTING REGULATORY SCHEME
Until recent years the inherent separation of ownership from the day-to-
day control of the modem corporate enterprise provided ample opportunities
for abuse by management. Specifically, corporate management was able to
perpetuate itself in office through misuse of the unregulated proxy and nondis-
closure of material information to the shareholders. 6 As the result of such
abuses and state inaction, Congress enacted section 14(a) of the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934, which is the statutory basis for federal regulation of
proxy solicitations.7
3. See Aranow & Einhorn, Proxy Regulation: Suggested Improvements, 28 Geo. Wash. L.
Rev. 306, 306 (1959), in which the authors make the following observation:
Most stockholders, because of inconvenience or indifference, do not attend stock-
holders' meetings in person. Instead, they generally execute proxies which authorize
other interested parties to represent and vote for them. Thus, the solicitation of proxies
from stockholders is a matter of vital importance in the election of directors and control
of the affairs of corporations; and with the great growth of publicly-held [sic] corpora-
tions, this has become a matter of national concern affecting the public welfare.
See also W. Cary & M. Eisenberg, Cases and Materials on Corporations 277 (5th ed. unab. 1980).
4. See H. Henn, supra note 2, at 386.
5. Management may include its nominees for director in the corporate proxy materials so
long as (1) a policy as opposed to a personnel issue is involved; (2) the expense of the materials
stems from informing the shareholders of the policy issue; and (3) the expense is reasonable.
Eisenberg, Access to the Corporate Proxy Machinery, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 1489, 1496-97 (1970). This
three-pronged test has been criticized as being "incapable of meaningful application" because
every proxy contest can be made to involve a policy issue. Id. at 1497-98. Thus, the test "is really
no test at all, and there seems to be only one modern case which has applied it to restrict manage-
ment's use of the corporate proxy machinery." Id. at 1498-99.
6. E. Aranow & H. Einhorn, Proxy Contests for Corporate Control 89 (2d ed. 1968).
7. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, § 14a, 48 Stat. 895 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78n
(1976)). Section 14(a), as amended, provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, by the use of the mails or by any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of any facility of a national securities exchange
or otherwise, in contravention of such rules and regulations as the [Securities Exchange]
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A4. Scope of Regulation
Although the power of shareholders to vote by proxy stems from state
law, state regulation of proxies and proxy solicitations is virtually nonexistent.
[T]oday every state permits proxy voting even in the absence of cer-
tificate or bylaw provision. But the purpose of the relevant statutory
provisions was merely to empower proxy voting, not to regulate its
mechanics, and while the proxy system grew in signifcance and com-
plexity, the corporate statutes failed to grow with it. By and large,
state corporate statutes do not even recognize the existence of proxy
solicitation, let alone regulate it.8
The federal regulatory scheme, in addition, is not without limits. Section 14(a)
expressly limits the rules that may be promulgated thereunder to situations
where there is a solicitation ofproxies, but the broad statutory definitions of
these terms encompass many non-routine communications preliminary to an
actual solicitation such as advertisements that are part of an overall plan to
solicit proxies.9 Nonetheless, not all proxy solicitations are subject to the fed-
eral proxy rules. Section 14(a) gives the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) authority only to prescribe rules and regulations concerning the solicita-
tion of proxies with respect to any security, absent an exemption, registered
pursuant to Section 12 of the Act. The proxy rules, therefore, extend only to
securities that either are listed on a national exchange or are issued as equity
securities by a corporation with assets of more than one million dollars and
shares held by 500 or more shareholders.10 Even with such limitations, the
federal proxy solicitation rules encompass a significant proportion of the se-
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors, to solicit or to permit the use of his name to solicit any proxy or
consent or authorization in respect of any security (other than an exempted security)
registered pursuant to section 12 of this title.
The legislative intent behind this section is quite clear, as the following House Report indicates:
Managements of properties owned by the investing public should not be permitted
to perpetuate themselves by the misuse of corporate proxies. Insiders having little or no
substantial interest in the properties they manage have often retained control without
adequate disclosure of their interest and without an adequate explanation of the man-
agement policies they intend to pursue. Insiders have at times solicited proxies without
fairly informing the stockholders of the purposes for which the proxies are to be used
and have used such proxies to take from the stockholders for their own selfish advantage
valuable property rights.
H.R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), reprinted in E. Aranow & H. Einhorn, supra note
6, at 89.
8. Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 1492. See E. Aranow & H. Einhorn, supra note 6, at 89.
9. Rule 14a-1 defines the term "proxy" to include every proxy, consent or authorization
within the meaning of Section 14(a) of the 1934 Act. Such consent or authorization may be in the
form of a failure to object. In addition, the rule defines the terms "solicit" and "solicitation" to
include (1) any request for a proxy; (2) any request to execute, not to execute or to revoke a proxy;
and (3) the supplying of a proxy or other communication "under circumstances reasonably calcu-
lated to result in the procurement, withholding or revocation of a proxy." 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-1
(1980).
For a discussion of non-routine proxy solicitations, see W. Cary & M. Eisenberg, supra note
3, at 286-90. It should be noted that the statutory definitions do not distinguish between oral and
written solicitations.
10. 15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (1976).
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curities traded in the over-the-counter markets.11 Finally, the SEC has ex-
pressly removed certain proxy solicitations from the scope of the proxy rules. 12
Prior to 1964 the proxy rules did not apply if the management of a listed
corporation controlled enough stock to avoid the need for the solicitation of
proxies. 13 Today, however, section 14(c) requires that if proxies are not solic-
ited prior to a meeting the issuer must file with the SEC and distribute to all
shareholders information substantially equivalent to the information that
would be required if a solicitation were made.14
B. The Federal Proxy Rules
The modem federal proxy rules promulgated by the SEC pursuant to sec-
tion 14(a) are a comprehensive set of regulations that form the basis for share-
holder control over the modem public corporation. The proxy rules, in effect,
provide a four-pronged approach to shareholder voting problems.15 First, the
rules require and provide the means for full disclosure of material information
concerning management's proposals for corporate action submitted to the
shareholders through the proxy machinery. Second, the rules prohibit fraud in
the solicitation of proxies. Third, the rules provide shareholders with the op-
portunity to solicit proxies from fellow shareholders and to require manage-
ment to include certain shareholder-generated proposals in its proxy
statement. Fourth, the rules require detailed disclosure from opposition
groups in the midst of proxy contests.
I. General Disclosure Provisions
Rule 14a-4 governs the form of proxy documents.' 6 Under this rule
shareholders must have the opportunity to approve or disapprove each matter
submitted to them, and, if the proxy involves the election of directors, to vote
for or against the directors nominated by the persons soliciting the proxy or to
withhold the authority to vote for such directors. With certain exceptions, the
rule prohibits broad grants of discretionary power to the nominee by the
proxy. Thus, under subsection 4(d) a proxy may not confer authority to vote
for any person who is not named in the proxy statement as a bona fide nomi-
nee. 17 Finally, a proxy is not effective as to any annual meeting other than the
next one.1
8
11. W. Cary & M. Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 269-70.
12. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2 (1980). The exemptions are contained in Rule 14a-2. Id. One of
the most important exemptions is for solicitations made otherwise than on behalf of management
where fewer than ten persons are solicited. Id. § 240.14a-2(a). For a discussion of the exemptions,
see W. Cary & M. Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 278.
13. See W. Cary & M. Eisenberg supra note 3, at 278-79.
14. 15 U.S.C. § 78/ (1976). See W. Cary & M. Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 278-79.
15. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a (1980) for the SEC's presentation of this four-pronged approach.
16. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4 (1980). The mechanics of presenting this information are covered
by rule 14a-5. Id. § 240-14a-5.
17. Id. § 240.14a-4(c)(l) through (5).
18. Id. § 240.14a-4(d).
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Rule 14a-3 governs the information to be furnished to shareholders. The
rule specifically provides that no solicitation of a proxy shall be made unless
each person solicited is, or has been, furnished a proxy containing the infor-
mation specified in Schedule 14A.19 The schedule requires detailed disclo-
sures of the matters to be acted upon at the meeting, the rights of the
shareholder and the names of the parties on whose behalf the solicitation is
made. In addition, if the solicitation is by management, information about the
directors or nominees for director must be supplied, including their names,
occupations, remuneration and financial interest in the issuer.20
Under Rule 14a-3(b), if the solicitation is made on behalf of management
and is related to an annual meeting of shareholders during which directors
will be elected, each proxy statement must be accompanied or preceded by an
annual report. Such report, consistent with the disclosure philosophy behind
the proxy rules,2 ' must contain specific information concerning the financial
position and management of the issuer.22
Rule 14a-6 governs the filing requirements for the proxy materials.23 In
general, under this rule all written, proxy-soliciting materials are required to
be filed with the SEC in advance of distribution to shareholders. The SEC
then processes these documents to determine whether they comply with the
disclosure standards of the proxy rules. If the SEC determines that any of the
preliminary material is objectionable, it notes the revisions necessary for com-
pliance and then notifies the proxy solicitor who, usually will follow the SEC's
suggestions. Furthermore the SEC has the power to begin proceedings in fed-
eral court to enjoin a solicitation, to compel a resolicitation or to enjoin the
voting of the proxies when it has found a violation of the rules.24 Although
the primary legal sanction is through the court system, the administrative ac-
tion, with its attendant publicity, forms a powerful deterrent. 25
2. Prohibition of False or Misleading Statements
One of the most important proxy rules, Rule 14a-9, contains a general
19. Id. § 240.14a-3.
20. Id. § 240.14a-101. For a discussion of the detailed disclosures required by Schedule 14A,
see W. Cary & M. Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 279; R. Jennings & R. Buxbaum, Corporations
Cases and Materials 289 (5th ed. 1979).
21. An SEC Release stated the rationale for amending the rules as follows:
The [Securities Exchange] Commission believes it is in the public interest that all'secur-
ity holders be provided with meaningful information regarding the business, manage-
ment, operations and financial position of the issuer and that the annual report is the
most suitable vehicle presently available for providing this information. Accordingly,
the Commission has amended Rules 14a-3 and 14c-3 to require that an annual report to
security holders contain a minimum quantum of meaningful business and financial in-
formation, most of which is already required in the annual report on Form 10-k, which
most issuers subject to the Proxy Rules file with the Commission.
Sec. Exch. Act Release No. 11,079, [1974] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,996.
22. See W. Cary & M. Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 279-80.
23. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-6 (1980).
24. See generally W. Cary & M. Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 281.
25. Id. See also E. Aranow & H. Einhom supra note 6, at 113.
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prohibition of materially false or misleading statements in communications
involving proxy solicitations. 26 A detailed and comprehensive analysis of
what constitutes a false or misleading statement under this rule is impractica-
ble because of the many factors involved. For example, one must consider the
nature of the statement, the context in which it was made, the individuals to
whom it was made, and the SEC policy at the relevant time.27 Certain guide-
lines, however, are provided by the notes accompanying the rule. 28
The relief available under rule 14a-9 is not limited to SEC action or en-
forcement proceedings. In the landmark decision of J.Z Case Co. v. Borak29
the United States Supreme Court implied a private cause of action under sec-
tion 14 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, thereby subjecting to civil
liability those persons who solicited proxies in violation of rule 14a-9.30 Fol-
lowing Borak, courts have struggled with issues such as the degree of culpabil-
ity necessary to hold a defendant liable, the causal connection that must be
established, the suitable form of relief and the appropriate measure of dam-
ages.3 1
3. Shareholder Communications
As rule 14a-ll makes clear, shareholders who wish to elect nominees
other than those recommended by management must engage in their own
proxy solicitations. 32 Under rule 14a-7 such shareholders may obtain, at man-
agement's option, either a complete shareholder address list or a mailing of the
shareholder's proxy materials by the corporation at the shareholder's ex-
pense.33
In addition, shareholder communication is provided for in rule 14a-8.
Under this rule management is obligated, under certain conditions, to include
a shareholder's proposal in its proxy statement if the shareholder notifies man-
agement of his intention to present the proposal for action at an upcoming
shareholder meeting.34 If management opposes a shareholder's proposal, it
must at the request of the shareholder include in its proxy statement a presen-
tation by the shareholder of not more than 200 words in support of his propo-
26. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1980). See R. Jennings & R. Buxbaum, supra note 20, at 296; R.
Hamilton, Cases and Materials on Corporations 495 (1976).
27. E. Aranow & H. Einhor, supra note 6, at 147.
28. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1980). In addition, the SEC specifically has addressed the
problems inherent in appraisals, projections and predictions. See W. Cary & M. Eisenberg, supra
note 3, at 314-20, for a discussion of the SEC's safe-harbor rule for projections.
29. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
30. Id.
31. See D. Ratner, Securities Regulation 622-43 (2d ed. 1980). For a statement of common
law principles involving fraud in the solicitation of proxies for election of directors, see R. Jen-
nings & R. Buxbaum, supra note 20, at 496.
32. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-11 (1980).
33. Id. § 240.14a-7.
34. Id. § 240.14a-8. The rule requires that the sponsoring shareholder be either a record or
beneficial owner of a security that is entitled to be voted at the meeting, from the time that the
proposal is submitted to the date of the meeting. Id. § 240.14a-8(a). In addition, timely presenta-
tion of the proposal to management is necessary. Id. § 240.14a-8(3)(i), (ii).
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sal.35 Management, however, does not have any length limitation on its
opposing statement.36
Not all shareholder proposals must be included in management's proxy
materials. Subsection (c) of rule 14a-8 lists thirteen conditions under which
management may omit from management's proxy materials a shareholder
proposal and supporting statement.37 Management may properly exclude a
shareholder proposal if
(I) The proposal is not a proper subject for shareholder action
under the laws of the issuing corporation's domicile;38
(2) The proposal would require the issuing corporation to violate
any state, federal or foreign law to which the issuer is subject;
(3) The proposal or its supporting statement does not conform to
the proxy rules or regulations, including Rule 14a-9;
(4) The proposal deals with a personal claim of the shareholder;
(5) The proposal involves a matter that is not significantly related
to the issuing corporation's business;
(6) The proposal involves a matter that is beyond corporate power
to effectuate;
(7) The proposal concerns the ordinary business operations of the
corporation;
(8) The proposal involves an election to office;
(9) The proposal is counter to a proposal that management will
submit; or
(10) The proposal has been rendered moot, involves dividend policy,
substantially resembles another proposal, or has been included in
management's proxy materials within the preceding five years but
did not obtain the requisite amoung of support.39
If corporate management seeks to exclude a shareholder proposal on any
of the substantive grounds listed in the rule, it must inform the shareholder
proponent and the SEC at least fifty days before filing the preliminary proxy
materials. ° The SEC staff will review the proposal, and if proper grounds for
exclusion exist, will issue a "no-action" letter advising management that it will
recommend to the SEC that no enforcement action be taken if the proposal is
omitted. In addition, the proposing shareholder may challenge management's
decision to exclude the proposal from its proxy materials by instituting a pri-
vate action.4 '
As previously noted, shareholder proposals may be ,properly excluded
from the management's proxy materials if they involve matters that are not
35. Id. § 240.14a-8(b).
36. Curzan & Pelesh, Revitalizing Corporate Democracy: Control of Investment Managers'
Voting on Social Responsibility Proxy Issues, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 670, 675 (1980).
37. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c) (1980).
38. The note to this subsection states that a proposal that is otherwise improper under state
law may be proper if framed as a recommendation. Id. § 240.14a-8(c)(1).
39. Id. § 240.14a-8(c)(l)-(13).
40. Id. § 240.14a-8(d).
41. See Curzan & Pelesh, supra note 36, at 675 n.32.
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proper subjects for shareholder action under the laws of the issuing corpora-
tion's domicile. Thus state law is relevant. Although there is a paucity of state
law in this area, the North Carolina Business Corporations Act addresses the
problem. Under G.S. 55-61(d), "[a]ny matter relating to the affairs of a corpo-
ration is a proper subject for action at an annual meeting of sharehold-
ers. ."42 This provision is unique among the states although North
Carolina courts have not as yet delineated its scope. A broad constructibn
would enable inclusion of any shareholder proposal while a narrower and per-
haps more reasonable interpretation would permit exclusion of proposals on
the basis of the other grounds noted in Rule 14a-8.
4. Disclosure by Opposition Groups
The proxy rules require detailed disclosure by groups opposing manage-
ment in a proxy contest. Rule 14a-I 1 governs solicitations "by any person or
group of persons for the purpose of opposing a solicitation subject to [this
regulation] by any other person or group of persons with respect to the election
or removal of directors at any annual or special meeting of security holders. '43
Under this provision, opposition shareholders are required to comply with
Schedule 14B. The information required to be disclosed includes the identity
of the parties, the extent of their financial interests in the issuer, the acquisition
of such interests, involvement in previous proxy contests, and plans for future
employment and transactions. Thus, the proxy scheme contemplates that cor-
porate shareholders will be adequately informed and able to vote intelligently
after the disclosure by management in Schedule 14A and by solicitors of prox-
ies other than management in contested elections in Schedule 14B.44
C Institutional Background of Proxy System
In describing the proxy system one should note the institutional setting in
which the system operates. Specifically, one must consider (1) the use of nom-
inees to serve as record holders of shares beneficially owned by others, and
(2) the rises of the large institutional investor.
The phenomenon of indirect ownership, whereby the securities of a cor-
poration are registered in the records of the issuer-corporation in other than
the name of the beneficial owner, is generally referred to as "nominee" or
"street name" registration 4s and is quite common. 46 Securities are held in
42. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-61(d) (1969).
43. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-ll (1980).
44. See R. Jennings & R. Buxbaum, supra note 20, at 293.
45. According to an SEC study of shareholder-issuer communications:
The practice of registering securities in the records of the issuer in other than the
name of the beneficial owner is commonly referred to as "nominee" and "street name"
registration. Nominee name registration refers to arrangements used by institutional in-
vestors (insurance companies and investment companies, among others) and financial
intermediaries (brokers, banks and trust companies) for the registration of securities held
by them for their own account or for the account of their customers who are beneficial
owners of the securities. Street name registration, a specialized type of nominee name
[Vol. 60
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street name to accommodate the financial community and its customers. With
the growing volume of securities transactions in financial markets, the need to
facilitate the transfer of securities is critical. Thus, the use of nominee or street
name registration has increased dramatically.47
Because the effectiveness of the information and disclosure requirements
of the proxy rules depends on the transmission of numerous documents to
those individuals empowered to vote the shares, the SEC specifically has ad-
dressed the communication problems caused whenever shares are registered in
the records of the issuer in other than the name of the beneficial owner. Rules
14b-l and 14a-3 require that all issuers and participating brokers forward the
proxy solicitation materials to all beneficial owners. 48 Accordingly, before the
annual meeting and prior to the record date, the corporate issuer transmits to
known intermediaries a single search letter, which inquires as to the quantity
of proxy materials needed for transmission to shareholders. After receipt of
this information, the issuer sends the materials to the intermediary for distri-
bution to the shareholders.4 9 The three basic types of financial institutions
that serve as intermediaries are banks, brokerage houses and securities deposi-
tories.50 As a general rule, banks possess and usually exercise voting discre-
tion with respect to most of the securities that they hold in nominee name.
Brokers, however, are subject to the regulations of the several stock exchanges
that limit the ability of a broker to vote shares held for a customer in the
absence of any voting instructions.5 ' Finally, depositories prepare lists of the
registration, refers to the practice of a broker registering in its name, or in the name of its
nominee, securities left with it by its customers or held by it for its own account.
SEC Street Name Study, Final Report to Congress, Dec. 3, 1976, at 1, cited in W. Cary & M.
Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 290.
46. One study in 1973 revealed that 17% of all corporate stock was held in street names. The
Silence Imposed by Street Names, Bus. Week, Dec. 8, 1973, at 40.
47. W. Cary & M. Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 290. Securities may be held in the name of
banks, broker-dealers and trust companies. Increasing numbers of these financial institutions de-
posit their securities with depositories that register and hold the securities in their own nominee
name. Such depositories effect deliveries of securities among participating financial institutions by
computer book entry. This system eliminates the physical movement of certificates. Id. See R.
Jeniings & R. Buxbaum, supra note 20, at 288.
As of 1979, the largest securities depository in the United States, the Depository Trust Com-
pany (DTC), had approximately 8.8 billion shares on deposit valued at $282 billion. For compari-
son, this was equivalent to approximately 34 percent of the shares registered on the New York
Stock Exchange at that time. W. Cary & M. Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 290. Most of these shares
were held in the name DTC's nominee, Cede & Co. Id.
48. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3, .14b-I (1980). See R. Hamilton, supra note 26, at 526.
49. Street Name Study, supra note 46, at 15-20. See R. Jennings & R. Buxbaum, supra note
20, at 288. The three basic methods used to vote securities of non-record shareholders through an
intermediary are as follows:
(1) the intermediary advises the shareowner of the matters to be voted on and requests
voting instructions which the intermediary carries out;
(2) the intermediary signs a blank proxy card and forwards it to the shareowner who
then votes and forwards the card to the issuer. . . ; or
(3) the-intermediary is given voting discretion by the shareowner and votes thereafter
without consulting the shareowner.
Street Name Study, supra note 45, at 15-20.
50. See note 47 supra for a discussion of securities depositories.
51. See R. Jennings & R. Buxbaum, supra note 20, at 289. Congress in 1964 gave the SEC
1981]
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participants' holdings in the securities on deposit at the record date and for-
ward them to the issuers, who are then able to forward the proxy materials to
the participants, who in turn forward the materials to the beneficial owners in
discharge of the participants' legal obligations. 52
Finally, a description of the present proxy system is not complete without
mention of the potential power of the large institutional investors, who often
possess the discretionary power to vote the shares of the beneficial owners.
The managers of the assets of bank trust departments and large institutional
investors possess a substantial amount of power in the corporate system, and
their involvement in the proxy system has a profound impact on corporate
behavior.53 Any analysis of the present proxy system, therefore, must include
considerations of the impact of these financial institutions.
II. A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE PROXY SYSTEM
A. Shareholder Democracy as a Policy Objective
The primary purpose of the proxy system is to promote corporate democ-
racy by facilitating shareholder participation in the control of the corporate
enterprise. The threshold inquiry, therefore, is whether shareholder democ-
racy is a valid policy objective, and if so, the extent to which such an objective
should be pursued.
To evaluate the role that shareholder participation plays in the manage-
ment and control of modem corporations, one must note initially the underly-
ing nature of the corporate system. When examining the publicly held
corporations that form the basis of our modem economic system, one is imme-
diately confronted with the phenomenon of separation of ownership from con-
trol: shareholder-owners do not manage the corporation and managers do not
possess appreciable ownership. In fact, this separation of control from owner-
ship has been said to be "a characteristic product of the corporate system. ' '5 4
Inherent dangers exist in this separation of ownership from control. Specifi-
broad powers to regulate brokers' practices involving street-name securities by enactment of sec-
tion 19(b). See 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (1976). The SEC, however, has not exercised its authority,
relying instead on the regulations of the several stock exchanges. W. Cary & M. Eisenberg, supra
note 3, at 291. For a more detailed discussion of the exchange rules, see note 103 infra.
52. W. Cary & M. Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 291-92.
53. See Curzan & Pelesh, supra note 36, at 671. The power of trustees or investment manag-
ers in proxy voting is evident from the tremendous numbers of shares they manage.
It is estimated that noninsured pension funds currently hold over fifteen percent of all
New York Stock Exchange securities. By 1985, at least fifty percent of the equity capital
of American corporations may be held by pension funds. At the end of 1976 over one
hundred bank trust departments were managing at least one billion dollars each in pen-
sion funds assets; the eight largest departments managed $85 billion of these assets.
Three banks, Morgan Guaranty Trust, Bankers Trust, and Citibank alone maintained
over $47 billion in equities within their portfolios through use of these assets. Even more
specifically, the Morgan Guaranty Trust was the largest single holder of stock in IBM,
Exxon, Eastman Kodak, General Electric, Ford Motor Company, Mobil Corporation,
Philip Morris, DuPont, Union Carbide, and IT&T.
Id. at 683-84.
54. A. Berle & G. Means, The Modem Corporation and Private Property 68-70 (1933).
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cally, with the power of ownership concentrated in the hands of corporate
managers, the opportunities for abuse dramatically increase. The potential for
managerial excesses has, in fact, often been realized. 55 It is evident that some
form of limitation or check on the power of corporate management is neces-
sary.56 But why should the control stem, at least in part, from the corporate
shareholders?
Various non-traditional alternatives to shareholder democracy have been
suggested. Essentially such proposals remove the element of shareholder con-
trol over the corporation and replace it with control by external groups com-
posed of individuals ranging from consumers and employees to government
representatives. 57 As should be evident, political considerations underly these
proposals, for at issueis the locus of control over modern economic institu-
tions.
Consistent with principles of democracy and capitalism, control over the
management of United States corporations traditionally has been provided by
the shareholders. The question therefore is, why should our economic system
attempt to mirror our democratic political system? Or in other words, what is
the actual value of an economic system having democratic underpinnings?
The answer, like the question, arises from political considerations. In the
words of one commentator:
As the economic operation of capitalism and communism con-
verge, it becomes apparent that in the long view the principal differ-
ence between these systems may not be which can best deliver goods
and services to the people but which system is most consistent with
liberty. And liberty will only persist where the political system and
the economic system which support it are both rooted in democratic
principles. 58
Thus, according to this view, the political rights of freedom and liberty are
best preserved by reliance upon democratic processes. It follows that corpo-
55. Caplin, Shareholder Nominations of Directors: A Program for Fair Corporate Suffrage,
39 Va. L. Rev. 141, 142 (1953). For a summary of the 1933 investigations of the 1929 stock market
collapse, see F. Pecora, Wall Street Under Oath (1939).
56. One school of thought, however, argues that lack of shareholder control and lessened
accountability of management to the shareholders provides management the necessary flexibility
to run the corporation efficiently and maximize economic goals. According to such 'manageris-
lists":
Only management. . . is in a position to advance the long-range interests of the corpo-
ration and serve the public interest in the viability of competitive economic enterprises.
To the extent that management's power and flexibility are diminished in favor of share-
holder control, management will be forced to sacrifice the long-term corporate welfare
and the corresponding public interest in order to preserve its tenure.
Note, A Proposal for the Designation of Shareholder Nominees for Directors in the Corporate
Proxy Statement, 74 Colum. L. Rev. 1139, 1143 (1974). This viewpoint has been criticized on the
basis of its paternalistic attitude toward shareholders and the dangers created by leaving manage-
ment's power unchecked. Id.
57. See Frank, The Future of Corporate Democracy, 28 Baylor L. Rev. 39, 45-50 (1976).
Such suggestions range from the elimination of the election of directors and the recognition of
managerialism to the participation of public client-groups and the government in corporate deci-
sionmaking. Id.
58. Id. at 58.
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rate democracy enhances political democracy. From a political perspective,
the concept of shareholder democracy can be understood easily and justified
when viewed as an attempt to mirror and preserve our democratic political
system.
In less theoretical terms, shareholder participation in corporate govern-
ance through majoritarian voting can be justified because it provides an effec-
tive and fair means of allocating and protecting rights over private assets.
Critics of corporate democracy, however, have questioned the basic notions
that it is desirable for shareholders to participate in the control of corporations
and that shareholders are able to make intelligent decisions. Many would
eliminate entirely shareholder voting on the theory that shareholders can pro-
tect their interests adequately by selling their shares or by initiating a deriva-
tive action.59 One must question whether the derivative suit offers adequate
protection for shareholder interests given the immense procedural and
financial burdens that face a prospective plaintiff. The only real protection
that a shareholder may have is to sell the stock. Professor Manne has ques-
tioned whether the sale of non-voting stock would protect the interest of share-
holders as well as the sale of voting stock and has concluded that, without the
vote, shareholders would have much less protection than they would with the
vote.60
As shareholder dissatisfaction grows and the market price of the
company's shares declines, the vote. . . assumes a greater impor-
tance. Ordinarily, outsiders can "buy" votes only as part of the pack-
age that includes the underlying share interest; but they can
nevertheless be bought. As the price of that package declines, outsid-
ers are attracted to the potential gain they may make by buying the
shares and managing the company efficiently; without the vote at-
tached there is no incentive to buy the package and improve the
management. Therefore, without the vote it seems certain that share-
holders as a group would have far less protection than they enjoy
today. . . . By allowing votes to move into the hands of those who
can best use them, as is indicated by their willingness to pay for
them, our corporation law establishes a very efficient democracy. 61
Thus, shareholders' participation in the form of per share voting facilitates the
efficient allocation of resources in a market economy.
In summary, shareholder participation is desirable not only because it is
an effective means of achieving the requisite control over corporate manage-
ment, but also because it is a fair way of allocating and protecting rights in-
volving private assets. In a democratic society with a market economy it is
natural for the principle of majority rule to spill over into the marketplace.
59. Manne, The "Higher Criticism" of the Modem Corporation, 62 Colum. L. Rev. 399, 410
(1962).
60. Id. at 411.
61. Id. at 410-11. In addition, one must question whether the shareholders' ability to sell out
of the corporation provides adequate protection, because certain large investors, such as institu-
tional investors, are unable to dispose readily of their holdings. Note, supra note 56, at 1142, 1146.
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The critical question, however, involves the extent of shareholder participation
that is desirable.
B. The Social Desirability of Shareholder Democracy
One could argue that since the problem stems from the separation of con-
trol from ownership, the solution lies merely in placing the control back in the
hands of the shareholders. Obviously there are inherent limitations to such a
scheme because it is unrealistic to assume that shareholders can exercise sig-
nificant management functions effectively in modem corporations. Separation
of ownership from control is, after all, inherent in the corporate system.62
Pure corporate democracy therefore is unattainable.
The federal proxy rules, for the most part, concentrate on the disclosure
of material information to corporate shareholders, with the goal of facilitating
shareholder voting. Such a disclosure objective is commendable but lays only
the groundwork for effective shareholder control and participation. The SEC
has not yet embraced more substantive shareholder participation as a desira-
ble policy objective. Nevertheless the SEC is in the midst of re-examining its
rules, particularly in terms of shareholder communications and participation
in the corporate electoral process.63
1. Shareholder Communications
The extent of shareholder communication concerning both social and ec-
onomic issues that is socially desirable remains an unsettled question, and nu-
merous proposals have been made either to limit or to expand such
participation. The present medium for shareholder communications is found
in Rule 14a-8, the shareholder proposal rule. The question, therefore, is
whether this rule already provides an acceptable mechanism for shareholders
to communicate their views on social as well as economic issues affecting the
corporation.
Even prior to its amendment in 1975, the rule had been utilized effectively
to raise numerous issues of concern to shareholders. 64 According to one com-
mentator:
[I]t is in the role of a platform for the airing of shareholder concerns
that Rule 14a-8 has played a real role. When a shareholder proposal
has obvious merit or when it is unable to achieve unusual levels of
voting support, although far less than needed for adoption, manage-
ment gets the message. Under Rule 14a-8, almost any matter of con-
cern to shareholders can be discussed either by way of a proposal or
as a supporting statement. 65
62. H. Henn, supra note 2, § 189.
63. Black, Shareholder Democracy and Corporate Governance, 5 Sec. Reg. L.J. 291, 292
(1978).
64. Id. at 297. See B. Longstreth & H. Rosenbloom, Corporate Responsibility and the Insti-
tutional Investors 20-23 (1973).
65., Black, supra note 63, at 298-99.
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The rule, however, has not escaped criticism. Specifically, the shareholder
proposal rule has been criticized on the basis that it allows a minority of politi-
cally motivated shareholders who are more concerned with social issues than
with the business of the corporation to air their views in the corporation's
proxy statement, even though few shareholders support the proposal and the
majority must bear the costs.66 Such criticism, however, fails to account for
the basic function served by the rule. There is no doubt that the rule presently
provides a mechanism for shareholders to express their views on issues affect-
ing the corporation. Shareholders, therefore, have the opportunity either to
influence management's actions or to hold management accountable for its
actions on these issues.67 As one commentator has said:
Whether the shareholder proposal process is to be judged a suc-
cess even if it only provides an opportunity to hold management ac-
countable, or whether a judgment about the success of the process
turns on whether it has resulted in changes in corporate behavior,
there is abundant evidence that the process has succeeded. 68
To many commentators concerned about the accountability of corpora-
tions to the public at large, however, the rule does not go far enough. A com-
mon proposal has been that the SEC adopt mandatory disclosure
requirements concerning matters of social significance. The SEC generally
has refused to require additional disclosure of non-economic matters because
of both the practical limitations inherent in the disclosure process 69 and the
statutory emphasis on disclosure of economic information. 70 In this author's
view, mandatory social disclosures may prove inherently unwieldy. Quanti-
66. Schwartz & Weiss, An Assessment of the SEC Shareholder Proposal Rule, 65 Geo. L.J.
635, 638 (1977).
67. Id. at 639. Milton Freeman, one of the drafters of the shareholder proposal rule, noted
the value of the rule as follows:
As we have seen, a stockholder almost never wins his point on a showdown vote at a
meeting. However, by forcing the management to a public defense of its position, the
shareholder may contribute to a better understanding between management and share-
holders. In some cases he may even cause a reappraisal by management of some aspects
of its position.
In judging the value of the stockholder proposal rule, I believe it is of no conse-
quence whether a stockholder ever prevails or management ever accepts a stockholder's
proposal. The value which I see in the rule is that to the extent stockholders challenge
the judgment of management, management is required to make a defense of its position.
Freeman, An Estimate of the Practical Consequences of the Stockholder's Proposal Rule, 34 U.
Det. LJ. 549, 555 (1957).
68. Schwartz & Weiss, supra note 66, at 640.
69. SEC Release No. 33-5627, [1975] Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) E-l, E-5.
70. Id. at E-5, E-I1. The report stated:
The Commission's experience over the years in proposing and framing disclosure
requrements has not led it to question the basic decision of Congress that, insofar as
investing is concerned, the primary interest of investors is economic. After all, the prin-
cipal, if not the only reason why people invest their money in securities is to obtain a
return [sic]. A variety of other motives are probably present in the investment decisions
of numerous investors but the only common thread is the hope for a satisfactory return,
and it is to this that a disclosure scheme intended to be useful to all must be primarily
addressed.
Id. at E-11. See Black, supra note 63, at 296.
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fying and organizing the tremendous number of social concerns may prove
impossible, and the resulting disclosure documents may be unmanageable as
well as confusing to the shareholders. A more plausible alternative is to pro-
vide a means by which individual shareholders may acquire the desired infor-
mation from management or express their views to other shareholders. The
present shareholder proposal rule adopts this latter approach and should be
commended for its simplicity and flexibility. In terms of social issues, rule
14a-8 strikes a desired balance between the competing interests involved, in
that it provides the basic mechanism for shareholders to air their grievances on
social issues but it does not overly intrude upon what is basically an economic
organization with economic objectives. Although enhancing the social ac-
countability of corporations is a worthwhile objective, it can best be achieved
by other means.7 1
In terms of the more fundamental economic issues, however, the rule un-
necessarily restricts the airing of shareholder concerns. Specifically, the rule
prohibits shareholders from commenting on management's proposals to be
submitted at the meeting.72 The rationale of this ground for omitting share-
holder proposals has always been unclear, and the rule has been subject to
criticism. 73 Clearly, responsible shareholder comment on management pro-
posals is a valid policy objective. Therefore, rule 14a-8(c)(9) should be
amended to eliminate the counterproposal ground for omission of shareholder
proposals. Such an action would facilitate shareholder communication on
highly relevant matters.
In summary, the current shareholder proposal rule provides an adequate
means of presenting shareholder views on social issues. Nonetheless, the
scope of shareholder comment on economic issues is unnecessarily restricted.
Elimination of the counterproposal ground for omission of shareholder pro-
posals would permit "the expression of shareholder views where they have the
most immediate relevance while preserving the remaining requirements of
Rule 14a-8 to weed out improper shareholder statements." 74
2. Shareholder Participation in the Corporate Electoral Process
The extent to which shareholder participation in the corporate electoral
process is socially desirable remains an open question. The most common
criticism of the proxy system, however, is that it unfairly favors management
in the selection of directors. The following observation was made more than
twenty-eight years ago and applies today:
This is not to say that proxy voting is bad per se. On the con-
trary, if properly used, it may prove to be the most effective instru-
71. The use of the proxy system to resolve social issues has been criticized. See Manne,
Shareholder Social Proposals Viewed by an Opponent, 24 Stan. L. Rev. 481, 492-93 (1972). The
shareholder proposal rule, however, by subjecting such matters to shareholder approval, merely
manifests the political system which underlies our economic system.
72. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(9) (1980).
73. See Black, supra note 63, at 299, 314.
74. Id. at 315.
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ment now available to us for furthering democratic control of public
issue corporations. However, as presently employed-with the proxy
machinery completely dominated by the managers of industry, with
the nominations for directors being made by the managers them-
selves, and with the shareholders being denied the opportunity of
making independent nominations in management's proxy state-
ment-the proxy system of voting has become an anti-democratic de-
vice, destructive of any real system of checks and balances against
possible managerial abuse, and operating in contravention of our
fundamental notions of fair play.75
Such criticism is not without substance. A realistic examination of sharehold-
ers' ability to nominate directors other than those approved by management
reveals that although shareholders technically possess the right to solicit prox-
ies independent of management and to engage in a proxy contest with incum-
bent management, such right is seldom exercised because of prohibitive costs.
Shareholders who engage in an independent proxy solicitation and proxy con-
test, unlike management, must face the prospect of bearing the full financial
costs of their efforts.76 Thus, on a practical level a full-scale independent
proxy contest is unavailable to most shareholders in a publicly held corpora-
tion.
The shareholders' only alternative to waging a proxy contest is to nomi-
nate their candidates from the floor at the corporation's annual meeting, but
under current proxy rules a nomination not made until the annual sharehold-
ers meeting is practically meaningless because a proxy may not confer the
power to vote for any person as a director unless that person is named in the
proxy statement as a bona fide nominee.77 Only the relatively few sharehold-
ers who attend the annual meeting or those exempt from application of the
proxy rules could vote for such nominees. 78 Practically speaking, manage-
ment is able to choose its nominees for the board of directors without fear of
opposition by shareholders.79 The question, therefore, is whether shareholder
access to the corporate proxy materials should be increased.
75. Caplin, supra note 55, at 151.
76. Id. at 151-52. A shareholder who wages an unsuccessful proxy contest generally may not
recoup the cost from corporate treasury. Id. Shareholders, however, who succeed in ousting man-
agement on the basis of a policy issue, may, with approval by the board of directors and a major-
ity of the shareholders, be reimbursed out of corporate funds. See Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine
& Airplane Corp., 309 N.Y. 168, 128 N.E.2d 291 (1955). For a discussion of whether shareholders
should have the right to use corporate funds to wage a proxy campaign, see R. Jennings & R.
Buxbaum, supra note 20, at 332-33. For an indication of the costs of a proxy contest, see E.
Aranow & H. Einhorn, supra note 6, at 543.
77. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(d) (1980). See also Caplin, supra note 55, at 159.
78. See Note, supra note 56, at 1139.
79. See Feis, Is Shareholder Democracy Attainable? 31 Bus. Law. 621, 621 (1976). To illus-
trate the extent of management's control over the election of directors, in 1972, there were 6,328
proxy statements filed that involved annual sharehodlers' meetings for the election of directors,
and managements nominees for the board of directors faced shareholder opposition in only 23
(about 1%) of the corporations. Note, supra note 56, at 1140 n.5.
One commentator has argued that "the management has taken away from the shareholders
the right to select directors by assuming in the management's proxy statement, which is in all
reality the company's proxy statement, the exclusive right to noninate directors." Caplin, supra
note 55, at 160.
[Vol. 60
SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRAJCY
The need for more effective shareholder control over corporate manage-
ment is often stated in terms of the lack of management's accountability to
shareholders and the general public.80 As one commentator stated:
It is apparent, as one surveys the constant stream of shareholder
suits, massive write-downs of assets, criticism of corporate financial
reporting, news about illegal and immoral political contributions, in-
ternational bribery, kickback and payoff arrangements, that too
many managements exercise uncontrolled power and take unfair ad-
vantage of the shareholders they purport to serve. Although it can be
conceded that the managers of most public corporations are consci-
entious and essentially honest, the incidents that come to light un-
doubtedly represent only a fraction of the problem. These recent
corporate scandals suggest that there are serious shortcomings in the
mechanism for overseeing managements and holding them more ac-
countable to the shareholders and the public at large.81
As a result of this belief, numerous reforms have been proposed aimed at facil-
itating corporate suffrage by requiring management to include shareholder
nominees in corporate proxy materials.82 It has been argued that providing
for the designation of shareholder nominees in the corporate proxy statement
can restore a degree of management accountability to shareholders. First,
management will be more aware of and responsive to its shareholder constitu-
ency.83 Second, "a new forum for the discussion of corporate problems and
policies" will be established in that shareholders will have both the incentive
and the opportunity to communicate with other shareholders concerning cor-
80. Feis, supra note 79, at 621-22.
81. Id. See Note, supra note 56, at 1142.
82. One early commentator, Professor Mortimer Caplin, argued that the essence of corporate
democracy is the ability of shareholders to elect those directors best suited to manage the corpor-
tion and to remove those directors having unsatisfactory records, and that it is here that corporate
democracy fails to be realized. Caplin, supra note 55, at 151. Professor Caplin's solution was
twofold in nature:
[F]irst, there should be opened to the shareholders of publicly owned corporations a real
channel for the free nominations of all directors; second, there should also be made
available to these shareholders adequate machinery to assure to them the right of both
choosing and electing at least one member of their Board of Directors.
Id. at 152. Accordingly, shareholders would vote on two different groups of nominees: one com-
prised of shareholder nominees from which one director would be selected, and another com-
prised of both management and shareholder nominees from which the remaining directors would
e selected. Id. at 153-54. For a discussion of similar proposals giving shareholders direct access
to corporate proxy materials, see Note, supra note 56, at 1154.
Many problems exist in implementing these proposals. For example, one must determine the
threshold barrier that shareholders must overcome to gain access to the corporate proxy statement,
the maximum number of shareholder nominees permissible, the proxy format, the allocation of
costs and the timing. For a discussion of procedures for implementation of designation of share-
holder nominees in corporate proxy materials, see id. at 1157-68. See also Feis, supra note 79, at
632-33; Frank, supra note 57, at 50.
83. According to one commentator.
Recognizing that designation of shareholder nominees for director could produce a
proxy ballot with candidates presenting diverse interests and advocating various posi-
tions, management might be encouraged to consider candidates for the board with an
ability to understand, and a willingness to serve, the interests of a broader gamut of
shareholder groups.
Note, supra note 56, at 1146-47.
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porate policies.84 Third, management will be more likely to adhere to its
fiduciary obligations when faced with the need to defend prior acts as well as
the greater risk of exposure.85 Finally, the inclusion of shareholder nominees
in the corporate proxy materials may increase the accountability of manage-
ment to the public at large in terms of greater corporate social responsibility.86
Providing shareholder access to corporate proxy material has the potential to
increase management accountability and is therefore a desirably policy objec-
tive. The problem, however, is one of choosing and implementing the best
means for achieving this objective.
At first glance the proposal to assure direct shareholder access to corpo-
rate proxy materials by SEC fiat appears, at least in theory, socially desira-
ble.87 On a more practical level, however, problems exist in implementing this
proposal 88 In evaluating modes of shareholder access to the corporate proxy
materials, one must be aware of the conflicting policy objectives involved.
On the one hand, the proposed reform is aimed at facilitating share-
holder communication and strengthening shareholder control over
the board of directors and, ultimately, management. On the other
hand, there is the danger-that this reform will encourage the harass-
ment of management and the waste of corporate assets, and render
the corporate proxy statement unintelligible.8 9
It is important to note the many unanswered questions regarding the desirabil-
ity of shareholder nominations for director in management's proxy material, 90
such as
84. Id. at 1147.
85. Id. at 1147-48.
86. Id. at 1168-69.
87. See Feis, supra note 79, at 638. One should note that shareholders may have access to the
corporate proxy materials under state law. Professor Eisenberg has argued that state corporations
law gives shareholders the right to designate candidates for the board of directors in corporate
proxy materials as a matter of law. Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 1505. He sees this right stemming
from the shareholders' exclusive power to elect directors. Id. Professor Eisenberg's thesis that
existing state corporations law permits shareholders to designate nominees in the corporate proxy
materials, however, has been criticized on the basis that "it is unlikely that any state court would
so hold." Note, supra note 56, at 1152-53. Professor Eisenberg's article did not cite any case in
support of his thesis.
Although it is not clear whether Professor Eisenberg is correct that shareholders are entitled
to designate nominees in management's proxy materials without any additional statutory or other
regulatory authorization, there is no state law which either prohibits shareholder nominations or
regulates how they are made. Black, supra note 63, at 301. Thus, the only obstacle to providing
for the designation of shareholder nominees in corporate proxy materials is the "fashioning of an
appropriate mechanism." Id.
88. See Feis, supra note 79, at 638-41. The SEC once considered amending the proxy rules to
allow shareholders' nominations for directors in the managements' proxy statement but aban-
doned that proposal after questions were raised as to its practicability. See R. Jennings & R.
Buxbaum, supra note 20, at 294.
The SEC recently has asked whether it should amend its proxy rules to allow shareholders to
propose charter amendments which authorize shareholder nominations of candidates for election
as directors even though this may not be a proper subject of shareholder action under state law. A
second question raised is whether shareholders should have access to management's proxy materi-
als for the express purpose of nominating directors. Black, supra note 63, at 299-300.
89. Note, supra note 56, at 1157.
90. For a discussion of the potential drawbacks of competitive elections, see Feis, supra note
79, at 638-43.
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(1) Will the lack of interest of the majority of shareholders permit a
disporportionate amount of power to reside in the minority or politi-
cally motivated shareholders?
(2) Will more competitive elections force directors to devote undue
attention to their re-election when they should be managing the cor-
poration?
(3) Will electioneering discourage participation by competent di-
rectors?
(4) Will the board of directors turn into a "debating society"?
(5) Will an appropriate means of determining which shareholder
nominees to include be found if too many individuals are nomi-
nated?9'
The uncertainties evident from these questions argue in favor of moderation
and experimentation.
In the spirit of moderation, one commentator has argued that the SEC
should encourage the formation of nominating committees and provide a
mechanism for the shareholders to offer their suggestions to such commit-
tees.92 Such shareholder input into the nominating process is a desirable first
step in restoring management's accountability to shareholders.
An additional approach that is available under the existing regulatory
scheme is for shareholders to submit proposals directing or recommending the
amendment of the corporate charter or bylaws to authorize shareholder nomi-
nees for director in the corporate proxy statement.93 Such proposals under
rule 14a-8 have been successful over the past thirty years and appear to be
valid under the rule.9 4
This shareholder proposal approach is advantageous because it requires
additional statutory or regulatory actions, provides public exposure to corpo-
rate responsibility and shareholders' rights issues by publication in manage-
ments' proxy materials, and is sufficiently flexible to accommodate the needs
of each corporation through individually tailored procedures for implementa-
91. Black, supra note 63, at 316.
92. Id. at 316. A subcommittee of the ABA Committee on Corporate Laws recently prepared
a guidebook suggesting a model for the board of directors of a publicly held corporation. Under
the proposal a nomination committee made up of non-management directors would have the
responsibility of suggesting nominees for directors.
Shareholders should be advised of this nominating committee role and encouraged
to submit their recommendations to the committee. This procedure will, it is believed, be
a more effective and workable method of affording access to the nominating process to
individual shareholders than a direct "right" of nominating in the corporation's proxy
materials.
Corporate Directors Guidebook, 32 Bus. Law. 5, 35 (1976). See Feis, supra note 79, at 632.
93. This approach is to be distinguished from a shareholder proposal that attempts to solicit
proxies for an opposition candidate. This direct approach is expressly prohibited. See 17 C.F.R1
240.14a-8(c)(8) (1980).
94. Black, supra note 63, at 300. See Note, supra note 56, at 1149. In states where sharehold-
ers do not have the power to amend the charter without initial director action, shareholder propos-
als or resolutions directing charter amendments may not satisfy the proper-subject-for-
shareholder-action test of Rule 14a-8(c)(1). Black, supra note 63, at 300. However, shareholder
resolutions phrased as recommendations to the board of directors appear to meet this test. See
note to rule 14a-8(c)(1), as amended in 1976, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(1) (1980).
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tion of proposals.95 Use of the shareholder proposal as a means of adopting
the designation of shareholder nominees, however, has been criticized because
the prospects that such a proposal will receive a majority of votes are slim and
the approach has a very limited impact in the sense that it does not extend to
companies outside the reach of the proxy rules and requires a separate reform
effort for each corporation. 96 One must question the validity of this criticism
because it assumes that the shareholders in every corporation should have ac-
cess to management's proxy statement. A shareholder proposal that fails to
gain a majority of votes fails because of shareholder disapproval. Why then
should one force such a system on every corporation? To require by legisla-
tive fiat shareholder access to management's proxy materials against the will
of the majority of shareholders is inconsistent with basic notions of corporate
democracy. Thus the true import of the shareholder proposal approach is its
placement of the decision in the hands of the shareholders and its treatment of
each corporation separately.97 Finally, one should note that such shareholder
proposals may succeed as public awareness grows, and that even when the
proposals fail, significant shareholder support for a proposal may influence the
actions of management. 98
Requiring that shareholders have direct access to corporate proxy materi-
als under federal law is a drastic alternative with many hidden pitfalls. There-
fore, the more sensible approach is to secure management accountability
through shareholder access to corporate nominating committees and through
shareholder proposals recommending charter or bylaw amendments that will
provide shareholders access to the individual corporation's proxy materials.99
3. Additional Reforms
There are a number of additional proposals aimed at enhancing share-
holder participation in the corporate electoral process by opening up the board
of directors. Such reforms include increasing the number of outside directors,
establishing minimum director qualifications, adopting cumulative voting, and
requiring more detailed disclosures involving candidates.1 0° The viability of
these reforms varies, yet all can be achieved through shareholder action under
the shareholder proposal rule.
95. Note, supra note 56, at 1149.
96. Id. at 1152.
97. This argument assumes that the beneficial shareholders are able to vote their shares effec-
tively. For a discussion of the proposed reforms necessary to accomplish this objective, see text
accompanying notes 101-22 infra.
98. Note, supra note 56, at 1151 n.65.
99. In commenting upon the desirability of providing shareholder access to management's
proxy materials under federal law, one former Securities Exchange Commissioner stated recently:
I am realistic enough not to be surprised if there eventually were additional legislation or
regulation at the federal level intended to assure greater accountability. I am hopeful
though that people are coming to appreciate that additional legislation and regulation do
not always have the intended result-indeed, often make matters worse.
Smith, Federal Corporate Law (May 9, 1977) (unpublished paper presented at a meeting of the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York), cited in Black, supra note 63, at 317.
100. See Feis, supra note 79, at 622-30. See also Black, supra note 63, at 307-12.
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C The Problem of Nominee Registration and the Institutional Investor
The rise of the institutional investor that often possesses the discretionary
power to vote shares beneficially owned by others, and the use of nominee, or
street name, registration pose serious problems for the proxy system. In fact,
the concentration of large amounts of stock in the hands of banks, trusts, pen-
sion funds, mutual funds and brokers has been called "the most cumbersome
stumbling block to effective corporate democracy."'' l Yet the extent of the
problem is often overstated.
The effects of the voting of shares registered in nominee name, for exam-
ple, do not appear as significant as had been previously thought.102 As noted
earlier, the present stock exchange regulations restrict the voting of shares reg-
istered in the names of brokers. Specifically, brokers may vote without in-
structions from the beneficial owners only when they are unaware of any
contest involving the matters to be submitted to the shareholders and the mat-
ters voted upon will not affect substantially the rights of the customers'
shares.' 0 3 However, if the broker forwards the requisite proxy materials to his
customer in advance of the meeting and the customer does not provide voting
instructions, the broker is permitted to give a proxy during the ten days prior
to the annual meeting on certain matters, including the election of directors.
This is known as the "ten-day rule."'1 4 In the "Street Name Study' ' 105 the
SEC assessed the impact of such broker voting under the ten-day rule by com-
paring the vote on non-ten-day rule matters with the vote on ten-day rule mat-
ters. The report concluded that the shares voted pursuant to the ten-day rule
without specific customer authorization had an average differential of only 5.3
percent when compared to the vote of shareholders who voted their shares
directly. 106 Thus, the empirical evidence does not support the view that nomi-
nee voting artificially increases the leverage of management.
In addition, the report found that the vast majority of banks, contrary to
previous practices, vote only those shares over which they have the beneficial
owner's specific written grant of authority.10 7 Therefore it appears that the
end results of corporate elections correspond to the general wishes of those
who are empowered to vote.
The question remains, however, whether those empowered to vote in the
present system accurately reflect the desires of the beneficial shareowners. t08
101. Frank, supra note 57, at 55.
102. Black, supra note 63, at 305. See Feis, supra note 79, at 635-36.
103. N.Y. Stock Exch. Rule 452. See Black, supra note 63, at 304.
104. N.Y. Stock Exch. Rules 451 & 452. See Black, supra note 63, at 304.
105. See note 44 supra.
106. See Black, supra note 63, at 305.
107. Id.
108. The use of discretionary proxies, therefore, has been questioned. See id. at 306. Yet as
previously noted, rule 14a-4 expressly prohibits broad grants of discretionary power to the nomi-
nee. In addition, to confer discretionary authority to vote, the proxy form must indicate clearly
how the nominee is intended to vote the shares represented by the proxy, and the beneficial share-
owner must sign the proxy. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(b)(1) (1980). This process, if anything, exem-
plifies shareholder democracy by placing control in the hands of the shareholder.
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As noted earlier, many investment manager-trustees possess exclusive voting
rights over the shares they control.109 What troubles many critics is that the
manner in which such investment managers vote their beneficiaries' shares
generally is not disclosed. 110 It is evident, however, that investment managers
do not generally vote their shares in favor of shareholder proposals concerning
social responsibility or opposition candidates for director. Thus the system
appears to have a built-in bias in favor of management."'
Numerous commentators have proposed, therefore, many statutory, regu-
latory and institutional reforms to improve the efficacy of proxy voting.' 12
Again, however, the problems stemming from the discretionary voting power
of investment managers can be exaggerated. Although there is no question
that institutional investors historically have opposed shareholder proposals in-
volving social responsibility issues, it would be incorrect to assume that such
investors generally oppose the substance of the proposals. There is much evi-
dence supporting the view that investors, particularly institutional investors,
often have objected to shareholder proposals because the proposals are either
too broad or merely poorly drafted and not because the investors objected to
the proposals in principle."13 In addition, it should be noted that some institu-
tional investors "pass through" to the beneficial owners the voting rights that
attach to shares. A noted proponent of this concept is Citibank, which has
argued that "the right to vote stock is inherent in stock ownership-not in its
custody or management."' " 4 The extent of pass-through voting, however, is
unclear. 115
Although the extent of the problems associated with the voting practices
of large institutional investors may have been exaggerated, some moderate re-
form is desirable to enable those beneficial owners who wish to participate in
voting decisions or to communicate their viewpoints to do so. A recent article
has offered five different proposals aimed at facilitating corporate democracy
by either increasing the beneficial shareowners' participation in voting deci-
sions or allowing smaller shareholders to air their views on specific corporate
policies." 6 The first proposal is to improve the flow of information. More
109. Curzan & Pelesh, supra note 36, at 684.
110. Id. at 686.
Ill. Id. at 671. See Feis, supra note 79, at 635-36.
112. The most drastic reform-4aking away the voting power of fiduciaries who manage
shares of beneficial owners-is obviously counterproductive because it would shift the power to
the smaller, individual shareholders who then would have a disproportionate amount of control
over the larger corporations. See Curzan & Pelesh, supra note 36, at 687. Suggested institutional
changes include limiting the quantity of common stock an investment manager could hold in a
single corporation or providing that proxy voting issues be brought before a committee of the
bank's directors or a number of outside advisors. Id. at 687-88.
113. Schwartz & Weiss, supra note 66, at 679-680 n.209. One study revealed that a large
percentage of the institutional investors surveyed said they considered social factors in their in-
vestment decisions. B. Longstreth & H. Rosenbloom, supra note 63, at 42-43.
114. Citibank Investment Management Group, 1976 Review 19 (1977), reprinted in part in
Curzan & Pelesh, supra note 36, at 686.
115. Curzan & Pelesh, supra note 36, at 686.
116. Id. at 688-700. The authors discussed these proposals in light of what they called "social
responsibility" proxy issues, yet the proposals are equally relevant to any issue subject to share-
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specifically, investment managers would be required to disclose information
regarding their proxy voting practices to both fellow shareholders and the ben-
eficial owners of the shares they manage.' 17 In addition, the corporations
themselves would be subject to question and answer requirements in their an-
nual reports.' 8 Second, shareholders could take a more active part in com-
municating their positions on issues by working with the large institutional
investors and establishing internal social responsibility committees. 19 Third,
participation in proxy voting by the actual beneficial owners of the shares
should be facilitated, that is to say, the beneficiaries of pension plans and other
trust accounts should be encouraged to exercise their voting rights.' 20 Fourth,
large shareholder-fiduciaries should be disqualified from proxy voting when
certain conflicts of interest arise.121 Finally, where pass-through voting is not
feasible, the beneficial owners should have the opportunity to choose the in-
vestment manager-trustee who will manage their shares.122
III. CONCLUSION
While commentators generally have noted that corporate democracy
stems from the corporate shareholders, many have lost sight of the principle
that the essence of corporate democracy is the majority rule of the sharehold-
ers. The goal of the proxy system should be to facilitate the wishes of the
majority of shareholders and not to promote unduly the aims of the minority.
The present proxy rules basically reflect this goal by emphasizing full disclo-
sure and allowing shareholder participation by means of independent proxy
holder approval. The proposals are one way of attacking the broader problems caused by large
institutional investors.
117. Id. at 688-89. The authors noted:
This information should include a clear description of the situations in which the trustee
exercises voting rights and when the rights are passed through to beneficiaries. A com-
plete description of any procedures for consulting persons having a beneficial interest in
the stock should also be given. Where the trust institution retains voting rights, informa-
tion should be provided on the procedures used to differentiate and to consider routine
and nonroutine shareholder proposals and the policies that guide voting on these issues.
In addition, these reports should disclose any other relationships between the bank and a
company in which it owns stock when the bank holds more than a fixed amount or
percentage of the company's stock. Finally, the annual voting records of trustees on
proxy issues should be fully disclosed.
Id. at 689.
118. Id. at 690.
119. Id. at 691. See Frank, supra note 57, at 55-56.
120. Curzan & Pelesh, supra note 36, at 694; see Frank, supra note 57, at 55-56. Such pass-
through voting is not always practical. For example, pass-through voting for pension fund benefi-
ciaries presents many difficulties in identifying the beneficiaries entitled to vote and the extent of a
given beneficiary's vote because of the large, constantly changing class of employee-beneficiaries
who have constantly changing interests in the fund. Curzan & Pelesh, supra note 36, at 694. As
the number of beneficiaries declines and the extent of their interests becomes more defined, pass-
through voting becomes more feasible. Thus, pass-through voting may be appropriate for "custo-
dial, personal trust, investment advisory, and many profit-sharing accounts." Id. At present the
regulations and statutes which govern financial institutions do not require pass-through voting.
Id. at 694 n.141.
121. Curzan & Pelesh, supra note 36, at 694-98.
122. Id. at 699.
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solicitations and shareholders proposals, both of which are subject to approval
by a majority of shareholders of the individual corporations.
Reforms aimed at increasing shareholder access to the corporate proxy
materials should be viewed in the same light, namely, they should be condi-
tioned upon shareholder approval at an individual, decentralized level. The
proposal to facilitate shareholder participation in the corporation by allowing
the designation of shareholder nominees in the corporate proxy materials
should be achieved, if at all, by means of the shareholder proposal rule and a
shareholder referendum. The success or failure of such reform will then be in
the hands of the shareholders. In addition, means of gauging shareholder
opinion should be encouraged, such as the use of nominating committees that
seek shareholder input into nominating decisions. Again, the emphasis should
be on the wishes of the shareholders.
In terms of shareholder communication, the present shareholder proposal
rule provides, consistent with the principle of majority rule, an adequate
means for shareholders to air their grievances on social issues without overly
intruding upon the functioning of what is basically an economic organization
with economic objectives. One must not lose sight of the fact that the corpo-
rate system in which the proxy system operates is itself part of a larger, demo-
cratic political system that is quite capable of exerting significant controls over
the corporate sector. Society, through both governmental and private initia-
tives, already possesses the means to control the social responsibility aspects of
its economic institutions. One should note that the existing system, in a lim-
ited sense, accommodates those investors who are truly concerned about social
issues. For example, mutual funds have been organized that employ social as
well as financial criteria in selecting their investments. 123 Such responses are
desirable because their success or failure depends upon the demands of the
private shareholder. Finally, in terms of economic issues, the present share-
holder proposal rule is unnecessarily restrictive and should be amended ac-
cordingly.
While attempts should be made to enable those beneficial shareowners
who wish to participate in voting decisions or to express their views to do so,
one must realize that the institutional investors who exert substantial control
over the corporate system appear to reflect the wishes of shareholders in gen-
eral. The nature of shareholders as a group dictates limits to the notion of
corporate democracy because shareholders are concerned primarily with eco-
nomic issues.124 Therefore, while it is important that shareholders have the
123. B. Longstreeth & H. Rosenbloom, supra note 64, at 20-23.
124. In the words of one commentator:
Shareholders are generally removed from the corporations they own; their orientation is
not that of owners examining with care the operation of their property, but rather that of
creditors measuring their satisfaction in terms of earnings per share and growth poten-
tial. Rather than independently examine management's policies and practice, they will
tend to defer to its expertise and accept on faith its disposition of corporate resources. If
earnings are poor or growth potential unrealized or nonexistent, they will usually express
their dissatisfaction by selling their shares.
Note, supra note 36, at 1142.
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requisite tools of corporate democracy, the extent of corporate democracy that
is forced upon them by legislative or administrative fiat should be re-
stricted. 125
Corporate democracy is a valid policy objective, yet the crucial issue in-
volves the extent to which such an objective should be pursued. To answer
this inquiry one must consider the political and economic systems which un-
derlie society and the nature of shareholders in general. This author, there-
fore, defines corporate democracy as that mix of shareholder and
governmental control that is socially desirable in the sense that it provides
sufficient checks on the discretion of corporate management and accounts for
the social and economic goals of society.126 The present proxy system pro-
vides the means to achieve this desired balance.
BARRY JAMES SOBERING
125. One must realize that not all shareholders assume passive roles. An example of the min-
ute number of shareholders who are concerned with the accountability of management and the
more routine corporate issues that arise in the course of business is Mr. Lewis Gilbert, who has
been called the "dean of stockholder-nitpickers." Forbes, March 30, 1981, at 131.
Now 73, Gilbert has made an art. . . out of getting to as many as possible of the annual
meetings his family's minuscule holdings in 1,500 companies entitle him to attend. He
publicly hassles CEOs over such matters as executive expense accounts and loans to
officers. "I'm only doing what a prudent fund manager ought to be doing," he says.
Id. As Mr. Gilbert's experience indicates, shareholders do have the opportunity to participate in
corporate democracy.
126. Such a definition recognizes that control over our economic institutions should stem from
both the shareholder-owners and society in general.
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